Stephen Chaudoin

Stephen Chaudoin
Office	414 David Kinley Hall
Email	chaudoin@illinois.edu
Phone	678 637 8392
Address	Department of Political Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 420 David Kinley Hall Urbana, IL 61801

Two Sides to Every Story: A Theory of Political Contestation and International Institutions
Abstract: A broad class of theories, applied to a wide array of substantive issues, argues that international institutions facilitate compliance by mobilizing pro-compliance domestic groups. I develop a model of political contestation over compliance policy in which international institutions can mobilize both pro- and anti-compliance groups. The theory is applicable to a wide variety of issue areas in international cooperation, types of political mobilization, and domestic political institutions. The model predicts that institutions have the greatest ability to increase compliance, where it otherwise would not have occurred, when the strengths of pro- and anti-compliance groups are balanced, ex ante. Institutions have a weaker effect on compliance when one group is much stronger than the other. I demonstrate key features of the model using the Kenyan experience with the International Criminal Court. I show how the ICC cemented the political alliance of two indicted candidates (i.e. anti-compliance actors) and helped them mobilize supporters. I also show how, consistent with the model's predictions, the ICC's indictments had the greatest effect on support for the most prominent indicted candidate in regions of Kenya where pro- and anti-indictment forces are balanced. Download Paper: (.pdf). Download Appendix: (.pdf).

Two Sides to Every Story: A Theory of Political Contestation and International Institutions

Abstract: A broad class of theories, applied to a wide array of substantive issues, argues that international institutions facilitate compliance by mobilizing pro-compliance domestic groups. I develop a model of political contestation over compliance policy in which international institutions can mobilize both pro- and anti-compliance groups. The theory is applicable to a wide variety of issue areas in international cooperation, types of political mobilization, and domestic political institutions. The model predicts that institutions have the greatest ability to increase compliance, where it otherwise would not have occurred, when the strengths of pro- and anti-compliance groups are balanced, ex ante. Institutions have a weaker effect on compliance when one group is much stronger than the other. I demonstrate key features of the model using the Kenyan experience with the International Criminal Court. I show how the ICC cemented the political alliance of two indicted candidates (i.e. anti-compliance actors) and helped them mobilize supporters. I also show how, consistent with the model's predictions, the ICC's indictments had the greatest effect on support for the most prominent indicted candidate in regions of Kenya where pro- and anti-indictment forces are balanced.
Download Paper: (.pdf).
Download Appendix: (.pdf).