Coauthored

Why do politicians blame offshoring for job losses when automation is also a culprit? Why have voters responded to automation and offshoring shocks by demanding a retreat from globalization but not transfers to the unemployed? We propose that both questions are explained by the collision of economic nationalism and comparative advantage trade. Economic nationalists, who dislike vulnerability and imports, oppose policies that hamper their own state's comparative advantage industries, like regulations of high-tech automation. They are more comfortable with tariffs restricting imports. In the United States, which has a comparative advantage in the production of capital intensive automation technologies, this effect undercuts the willingness of voters to support policies that would protect jobs by regulating automation. Opportunistic politicians emphasize offshoring because economic nationalist voters support limiting imports but are conflicted in their support for limiting automation. We develop a formal model of a citizen's demand for policy in response to economic dislocation, where citizens form preferences over redistribution plans and a policy response that blunts dislocation (like a tariff or a restriction on automation). The source (foreign versus domestic) and type (labor versus automation) of a shock affects the preferred weights citizens place on each policy. We test the model’s predictions with a survey experiment fielded in the United States. Consistent with expectations, domestic automation shocks increase the weight respondents place on redistribution versus a regulatory response, while globalization shocks place much heavier weight on regulatory (tariff) responses. Altering the source of each shock - by emphasizing foreign-produced automation technology or within-country labor relocation - reweights responses towards regulations in the former case and redistribution in the latter case. Our findings contribute to our understanding of the political consequences of the current populist moment as well as give predictions about how the tide of popular sentiment could turn against automation.

When international institutions take actions against states, does this persuade citizens in "global swing states" to back efforts against the accused? For example, it is well-understood that Russian President Putin is unlikely to ever be arrested and tried at the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes in Ukraine. But do these accusations increase support for the sanctions regime, military aid to Ukraine, or diplomatic censuring of Russia? We focus on "swing states" like India, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey because they are not perfectly aligned with the West or its adversaries. We use survey experiments and media content analysis to test different models of the effects of IO accusations on external pressure.

How do governments address economic shocks associated with globalization and automation in the current polarized environment? The prevailing consensus redistribution policies in response to globalization have been unsuccessful, primarily because conservatives’ reluctance to support redistribution measures leads to persistent gridlock and emphasis on tariffs. We show the history and feasibility of political support for social investment, which is a key subset of redistribution policies. Social investments are aimed at improving upward mobility and opportunity, in contrast with tax-and-transfer redistribution that compensates those harmed. We hypothesize that many citizens prefer the former because it restores perceptions of labor market fairness and increases optimism about the competitiveness of domestic production. We use local-level spending data from US counties from 1991-2023 to show how counties that were hardest hit by globalization increased their spending on education – a pillar of social investment – at faster rates than counties less hit by globalization. Remarkably, this phenomenon is present in both Republican and Democratic counties. We then analyze data from two large survey experiments (N = 3,000 and N = 4,100) showing how exposure to prompts about globalization increase support for social investment, even though they do not increase support for tax-and-transfer redistribution. We again show that these patterns are present for both conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats. We use the survey experimental evidence to show how these patterns extend to economic dislocation from other sources, like automation and climate regulation. Our research provides retrospective and prospective support for the growing idea that social investment and “predistribution” are more politically feasible than tax-and-transfer redistribution. Our results paint a more optimistic picture about responses to dislocation from globalization, with implications for the feasibility of responses to the growing effects of automation regulations designed to limit climate change.