Stephen Chaudoin

Stephen Chaudoin
Office	414 David Kinley Hall
Email	chaudoin@illinois.edu
Phone	678 637 8392
Address	Department of Political Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 420 David Kinley Hall Urbana, IL 61801

Ratification Patterns and the Limits of the International Criminal Court
With Terrence Chapman. Abstract: What types of countries have ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court? Because the court relies on state cooperation, it is a good example of a regime facing a "participation problem." In order to be effective, the regime requires active members, but states that fear regime effectiveness will therefore find it potentially costly to join. We analyze the extent to which this problem plagues the ICC. We find that countries for whom compliance is likely to be easiest -- democracies with little internal violence -- are the most likely countries to join the ICC. On the other hand, countries with the most to fear from ICC prosecution, non-democracies with weak legal systems and a history of domestic political violence, tend to avoid ratification. We contrast our findings with those of a recent article by Beth Simmons and Allison Danner (2010), arguing that ratification patterns show evidence of credible commitments. Our analysis across a breadth of evidence, both descriptive and multivariate, suggests caution towards arguments about the impact of the ICC on global practices and provides support for the notion that states strategically select themselves into supranational judicial agreements. Download Paper: (.pdf). Download Data, Do Files: (From my Dataverse). Data on ICC ratification and other variables were generously provided by Beth Simmons and Alison Danner, from their 2010 International Organization article. Data on judicial independence were generously provided by Linda Camp Keith, C. Neil Tate, and Steven C. Poe, from their various articles and Prof. Camp Keith's forthcoming book. Related Presentations: "The Limits of an International War Crimes Regime," presented at the 3rd Annual Conference of the Political Economy of International Organizations, Zurich, Switzerland. January 2011. "Ratification Patterns of the International Criminal Court," presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Associate, Chicago, IL. April 2011.

Ratification Patterns and the Limits of the International Criminal Court

With Terrence Chapman.
Abstract: What types of countries have ratified the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court? Because the court relies on state cooperation, it is a good example of a regime facing a "participation problem." In order to be effective, the regime requires active members, but states that fear regime effectiveness will therefore find it potentially costly to join. We analyze the extent to which this problem plagues the ICC. We find that countries for whom compliance is likely to be easiest -- democracies with little internal violence -- are the most likely countries to join the ICC. On the other hand, countries with the most to fear from ICC prosecution, non-democracies with weak legal systems and a history of domestic political violence, tend to avoid ratification. We contrast our findings with those of a recent article by Beth Simmons and Allison Danner (2010), arguing that ratification patterns show evidence of credible commitments. Our analysis across a breadth of evidence, both descriptive and multivariate, suggests caution towards arguments about the impact of the ICC on global practices and provides support for the notion that states strategically select themselves into supranational judicial agreements.
Download Paper: (.pdf).
Download Data, Do Files: (From my Dataverse).
Data on ICC ratification and other variables were generously provided by Beth Simmons and Alison Danner, from their 2010 International Organization article. Data on judicial independence were generously provided by Linda Camp Keith, C. Neil Tate, and Steven C. Poe, from their various articles and Prof. Camp Keith's forthcoming book.
Related Presentations:
"The Limits of an International War Crimes Regime," presented at the 3rd Annual Conference of the Political Economy of International Organizations, Zurich, Switzerland. January 2011.
"Ratification Patterns of the International Criminal Court," presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Associate, Chicago, IL. April 2011.

University of Illinois, Political Science