Stephen Chaudoin

Stephen Chaudoin
Office	414 David Kinley Hall
Email	chaudoin@illinois.edu
Phone	678 637 8392
Address	Department of Political Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 420 David Kinley Hall Urbana, IL 61801

Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes
Abstract: If international institutions are such potent alarm mechanisms that mobilize pro-compliance domestic audiences, as argued by many existing theories, then why do countries wait so long before sounding the alarm? WTO members often wait months or even years before objecting to their trading partners' WTO-illegal barriers. To turn a phrase, trade cooperation delayed is trade cooperation denied, so why wait? To explain this variation, I develop a theory of institutional alarm mechanisms in which (a) the preferences and strength of the audience hearing the alarm vary and (b) the decision to sound the alarm is strategic. Sounding the alarm is most valuable when strong audiences in the defendant country support compliance. I test this prediction using competing risks models analyzing the timing ofWTO disputes against U.S. tariff barriers. I show that, consistent with the theory, disputes are more likely during election years when macroeconomic indicators suggest broader support for free trade. Originally, this paper was two separate projects: one theoretical and one empirical. This is a combination of the two. Download Paper: (.pdf). Download Data, Do Files: (From my Dataverse). Related Presentations: "Information Transmission and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes," presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. November 2010. -- Also presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington D.C. September 2010. -- Also presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. April 2010. "Political Agency and Dispute Settlement in International Organizations," presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. March 2011. -- Also presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI. November 2011. -- Also presented at the 5th Annual Political Economy of International Organizations, Villanova, Philadelphia, PA. January 2012.

Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes

Abstract: If international institutions are such potent alarm mechanisms that mobilize pro-compliance domestic audiences, as argued by many existing theories, then why do countries wait so long before sounding the alarm? WTO members often wait months or even years before objecting to their trading partners' WTO-illegal barriers. To turn a phrase, trade cooperation delayed is trade cooperation denied, so why wait? To explain this variation, I develop a theory of institutional alarm mechanisms in which (a) the preferences and strength of the audience hearing the alarm vary and (b) the decision to sound the alarm is strategic. Sounding the alarm is most valuable when strong audiences in the defendant country support compliance. I test this prediction using competing risks models analyzing the timing ofWTO disputes against U.S. tariff barriers. I show that, consistent with the theory, disputes are more likely during election years when macroeconomic indicators suggest broader support for free trade. Originally, this paper was two separate projects: one theoretical and one empirical. This is a combination of the two.
Download Paper: (.pdf).
Download Data, Do Files: (From my Dataverse).
Related Presentations:
"Information Transmission and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes," presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. November 2010.
-- Also presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington D.C. September 2010.
-- Also presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. April 2010.

"Political Agency and Dispute Settlement in International Organizations," presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. March 2011.
-- Also presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI. November 2011.

-- Also presented at the 5th Annual Political Economy of International Organizations, Villanova, Philadelphia, PA. January 2012.

University of Illinois, Political Science