Appendix for: Public Reactions to International Legal Institutions

August 5, 2017

The main manuscript presents the results from our primary analyses. Space constraints prevent us from presenting or discussing all of the analysis, especially related to the United States survey. This appendix contains that additional analysis, along with the motivation for each additional set of results.

Contents

1 Kyrgyzstan Survey: Supplementary Analysis

1.1 Frequentist, Regression Analysis of Overall Treatment Effect

The main manuscript showed the effect of treatment on the investigation outcome variable using a Bayesian figure. Table 9 shows the treatment effects for the *Inv. App.* outcome in binary (top portion) and categorical form (bottom portion). The treatment effect is apparent in the categorical version of the outcome variable as well. The treatment more than doubles the percentage of respondents who indicated that the investigation was a "Very bad" thing.

	Investigation Approval (Binary)					
Treatment Group	N	% Approv.	Difference	S.E.	t-stat	p-value
Control	396	83.1				
Treatment	410	72.9	-10.2	0.03	-3.50	<0.01

	Investigation Approval (Categorical)			
	Very bad	Somewhat bad	Somewhat good	Very good
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment Group				
Control	22	45	208	121
	5.6%	11.4%	52.5%	30.6%
Treatment	51	60	183	116
	12.4%	14.6%	44.6%	28.3%

Table 1: Treatment Effects: Investigation Outcome

These treatment effects are also robust to various regression specifications and techniques. Table 2 shows results from four logit regressions of the binary *Inv. App.* variable on a treatment indicator and control variables. The results are robust and display a consistent magnitude across specifications. The first column shows the treatment effect on approval in a simple logit regression, including standard errors that are clustered by geographical region. The second column shows results from a conditional region-fixed effects logit model. The third column includes a set of pre-treatment control variables.[1] The fourth column includes the controls in a conditional region-fixed effects logit model.

For the controls, *Uzbek* codes respondents based on whether their first name indicated that they were ethnically Uzbek.[2] *Under 50* is a binary variable indicating that the respondent was

[1] Again, with region-clustered standard errors.

[2] We did not directly ask the respondents' ethnicities. The survey firm coded respondent ethnicity based on first names with a high degree of confidence. Highlighting ethnicity in the survey might have heightened the treatment effect since the Osh events involved inter-ethnic violence.

under 50 years old. *Male* is a binary indicator for male respondents. *Any PS Educ.* is a binary variable indicating whether the respondent received any post-secondary education. *Employed* is a binary indicator for employed respondents. *Income Ab. Av.* is a binary variable for whether the respondent indicated that her income was above average. Among the control variables, none significantly affected approval for investigations.

	Logit	Region FE	w/ controls	Region FE w/ controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-.600	-.606	-.574	-.578
	(0.134)***	(0.175)***	(0.139)***	(0.18)***
Uzbek			-.145	-.118
			(0.12)	(0.284)
Under 50			-.039	-.035
			(0.167)	(0.19)
Male			-.151	-.175
			(0.205)	(0.187)
Post Sec. Ed.			0.16	0.269
			(0.211)	(0.197)
Employed			-.080	-.017
			(0.255)	(0.208)
Income Ab. Av.			-.176	-.177
			(0.24)	(0.224)
Const.	1.591		1.786	
	(0.1)***		(0.251)***	
Obs.	806	806	806	806

Table 2: Treatment Effects: Investigation Outcome, Logit Regressions

1.2 Categorical distributions of the DVs

The main manuscript often uses a binary indicator variable for whether a respondent approves of an investigation or the ICC. Here, we show the full distributions of the outcome variables, for treatment and control conditions. The first two figures show the distributions for the full sample, for each of the two outcome variables. Figures 3-6 show those same distributions, broken down into Osh and Non-Osh regions. Osh regions consist of the same sub-sample as in the manuscript, with Osh referring to Osh, Osh oblast, and Jalal-Abad, for conciseness. The figures show how the treatment condition shifts the distributions leftward, towards disapproval.



Figure 1: Investigation Outcome



Figure 2: ICC Outcome



Figure 3: Osh (Inv. Outcome)



Figure 4: Non-Osh (Inv. Outcome)



Figure 5: Osh (ICC Outcome)



Figure 6: Non-Osh (ICC Outcome)

1.3 Treatment Effects for the ICC DV

This section replicates the first set of logit regressions from the preceding appendix section, only here, we use the ICC outcome measure instead of the investigations outcome measure. The results are generally similar. Treatment lowers approval for the ICC as an institution, although, in general, the effects are weaker in substantive terms. They are not statistically significant in some specifications.

Treatment Group	*ICC Approval* (Binary)					
	N	% Approv.	Difference	S.E.	t-stat	p-value
Control	338	81.3				
Treatment	351	76.1	-5.3	0.03	-1.70	0.09

	ICC Approval (Categorical)			
	Very neg.	Somewhat neg.	Somewhat pos.	Very pos.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment Group				
Control	18	45	189	86
	5.3%	13.3%	55.9%	25.4%
Treatment	36	48	179	88
	10.3%	13.4%	51.0%	25.1%

Table 3: Treatment Effects, ICC Outcome

	Logit	Region FE	w/ controls	Region FE w/ controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-.317	-.301	-.241	-.216
	(0.075)***	(0.189)	(0.09)***	(0.197)
Uzbek			-.293	-.492
			(0.335)	(0.306)
Under 50			-.209	-.197
			(0.188)	(0.216)
Male			-.389	-.390
			(0.083)***	(0.206)*
Post Sec. Educ.			-.182	0.091
			(0.274)	(0.214)
Employed			-.240	-.229
			(0.21)	(0.219)
Income Ab. Av.			-.373	-.442
			(0.302)	(0.263)*
Constant	1.474		2.236	
	(0.161)***		(0.336)***	
N	689	689	689	689

Table 4: Logit table, ICC Outcome



Figure 7: Treatment Effects, ICC Outcome

For the interaction terms models, awareness of the ICC actually magnified the negative treatment effect slightly. This is still consistent with the main manuscript's results, where awareness of the ICC does not mute the treatment effect, as would have been expected from extant predictions.

The results for the government approval interactions were similar to the main manuscript, with government approval raising approval of the ICC in the control condition, but magnifying the negative reaction in the treatment condition.

	Logit	Region FE	w/ controls	Region FE w/ controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-.148	-.113	-.093	-.068
	(0.111)	(0.232)	(0.13)	(0.238)
Heard of ICC	0.095	0.32	0.191	0.298
	(0.187)	(0.319)	(0.228)	(0.328)
Tmt∗Heard	-.488	-.566	-.443	-.506
	(0.232)**	(0.41)	(0.236)*	(0.413)
Uzbek			-.304	-.401
			(0.328)	(0.304)
Under 50			-.206	-.196
			(0.183)	(0.216)
Male			-.377	-.384
			(0.086)***	(0.204)*
Post Sec. Educ.			-.162	-.034
			(0.287)	(0.222)
Employed			-.230	-.223
			(0.215)	(0.219)
Income Ab. Av.			-.378	-.426
			(0.295)	(0.262)
Constant	1.446		2.165	2.094
	(0.188)***		(0.335)***	(0.356)***
N	689	689	689	689

Table 5: Treatment Effects: ICC Outcome, Heard of ICC Interactions

1.4 Logit regressions for Uzbek and Non-Uzbek

The main manuscript showed the effect of treatment on approval for investigations for Uzbeks and non-Uzbeks, using the Bayesian figures. Those same results obtain using the frequentist regressions. The table below replicates the main regressions, only with treatment interacted with the indicator variable for Uzbek respondents. The first two columns show results using respondents from all regions, while the third and fourth columns limit analysis to Osh/Osh Oblast/Jalal Abad. We did not include fixed effects regressions here, because the Uzbek populations are heavily concentrated in three regions.

As in the beta distribution figures, there is a slightly larger, negative treatment effect in the full sample. However, the difference in treatment effects for Uzbek and non-Uzbek citizens is stronger and statistically significant in the Osh/Osh Oblast/Jalal Abad subsample.

	Logit	Region FE	w/ controls	Region FE w/ controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.244	0.262	0.355	0.352
	(0.161)	(0.293)	(0.135)***	(0.304)
Gov. App.	1.196	1.162	1.240	1.176
	(0.286)***	(0.304)***	(0.261)***	(0.307)***
Tmt*Gov. App.	-1.101	-1.085	-1.128	-1.053
	(0.338)***	(0.412)***	(0.295)***	(0.417)**
Uzbek			-.405	-.582
			(0.338)	(0.325)*
Under 50			-.119	-.108
			(0.21)	(0.226)
Male			-.490	-.479
			(0.11)***	(0.219)**
Post Sec. Educ.			-.086	0.221
			(0.315)	(0.229)
Employed			-.218	-.218
			(0.184)	(0.233)
Income Ab. Av.			-.386	-.449
			(0.259)	(0.274)
Constant	0.901		1.584	
	(0.151)***		(0.32)***	
N	657	657	657	657

Table 6: Treatment Effects: ICC Outcome, Gov. Approval Interactions

	Full Sample	Full Sample w/ controls	Osh Only	Osh Only, w/ controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-.574	-.554	-.653	-.634
	(0.117)***	(0.129)***	(0.221)***	(0.178)***
Uzbek	-.017	-.018	0.241	0.271
	(0.27)	(0.285)	(0.167)	(0.217)
Tmt.∗Uzbek	-.213	-.194	-.573	-.577
	(0.497)	(0.483)	(0.291)**	(0.256)**
Under 50		-.038		-.209
		(0.166)		(0.177)
Male		-.149		-.086
		(0.204)		(0.223)
Post Sec. Educ.		0.159		0.31
		(0.208)		(0.314)
Employed		-.080		0.127
		(0.254)		(0.23)
Income Ab. Av.		-.176		-.586
		(0.241)		(0.404)
Constant	1.593	1.773	1.464	1.997
	(0.113)***	(0.245)***	(0.067)***	(0.528)***
N	806	806	352	352

Table 7: Uzbek Interaction Term Models, Investigation DV

1.5 Analysis with the "Don't Know/Refuse to Answer" (DKRTA)

The main manuscript excluded respondents who answered "Don't know" or refused to answer for each of the outcome variables. In the table headers, we abbreviate this with DKRTA. This section replicates the main results including those observations. We talked to our survey enumerators about the possibility that respondents hid approval or disapproval of investigations or the ICC, instead choosing DKRTA. Our survey enumerators did not think this was likely to be a significant problem, based on their expertise. This also comported with our prior beliefs. The 2010 violence is a heavy subject, but it is also a subject that we found Kyrgyz citizens generally willing to discuss. The survey was conducted at approximately the five year anniversary of the violence, and the violence was mentioned and discussed in the media in 2015. Where respondents choose DKRTA, we therefore thought it more likely than not that they did not have a strong opinion one way or another. We therefore coded the DKRTA respondents as not approving, suspecting that DKRTA was more likely to indicate a lack of support, rather than hidden support.

In general, the results are consistent with those in the main manuscript. There is a negative and significant treatment effect. The treatment effect is generally smaller than in the main analysis. Table 8 shows the simple descriptive from the main analysis. Treatment decreases approval for investigations by approximately 6% and the effect is significant at the 0.05 level. Figure 8 shows the analogous result using the Bayesian approach. Table 9 shows the logit regression specifications, with a negative and significant treatment effect across each model.

	Investigation Approval (Binary)					
Treatment Group						
	N	% Approv.	Difference	S.E.	t-stat	p-value
Control	500	65.8				
Treatment	500	59.8	-6	0.03	-1.96	0.05

Table 8: Treatment Effects: Investigation Outcome, including DKRTA



Figure 8: Treatment Effects: Investigation Outcome, including DKRTA

	Logit	Region FE	w/ controls	Region FE w/ controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-.257	-.266	-.262	-.281
	(0.123)**	(0.134)**	(0.117)**	(0.137)**
Uzbek			-.409	-.565
			(0.204)**	(0.213)***
Under 50			0.162	0.137
			(0.176)	(0.145)
Male			0.061	0.081
			(0.195)	(0.145)
Post Sec. Educ.			0.263	0.322
			(0.172)	(0.154)**
Employed			-.053	0.036
			(0.255)	(0.168)
Income Ab. Av.			0.078	-.013
			(0.176)	(0.167)
Const.	0.654		0.434	
	(0.196)***		(0.352)	
Obs.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000

Table 9: Logit Regressions: Investigation Outcome, including DKRTA

The moderation results were also generally similar. For proximity moderation, the difference between treatment and control, including DKRTA, was particularly stark, as in Figure 9. The treat-



Figure 9: Treatment Effects: Investigation Outcome, including DKRTA, Osh vs non-Osh Regions

ment effect in Osh/Osh Oblast/Jalal Abad was approximately -10%, compared to a treatment effect of approximately -3% in the other regions. The region specific treatment effects were different in the multilevel model, though Osh Oblast had the largest, negative treatment effect estimate. The treatment effect for Uzbeks in Osh/Osh Oblast/Jalal Abad was negative, compared to a slightly positive treatment effect in other regions, which is consistent with the main results. Though, the differences are smaller.

Treatment Effects, Uzbek/Non-Uzbek Respondents, including DKRTA



Figure 10: All Regions



Figure 11: Osh/Osh Oblast/Jalal-Abad

For the moderation arguments about awareness of the ICC and government approval, the results were again consistent. Having heard of the ICC was actually associated with a slightly larger, negative treatment effect, as in Table 10. Like the main results, this is inconsistent with the predictions of extant arguments that awareness of the court should mute disapproval of specific investigations. Government approval again magnified the negative treatment effect, as in Table 11. Though, this effect was smaller in magnitude and the interaction term was not statistically significant.

	Logit	Region FE	w/ controls	Region FE w/ controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-.265	-.286	-.249	-.276
	(0.155)*	(0.151)*	(0.157)	(0.153)*
Heard of ICC	0.989	0.946	0.979	0.939
	(0.184)***	(0.27)***	(0.21)***	(0.275)***
Tmt.∗Heard	-.182	-.107	-.184	-.135
	(0.357)	(0.352)	(0.372)	(0.354)
Uzbek			-.387	-.535
			(0.214)*	(0.215)**
Under 50			0.209	0.192
			(0.165)	(0.147)
Male			-.003	0.015
			(0.193)	(0.147)
Post Sec. Educ.			0.071	0.151
			(0.157)	(0.158)
Employed			-.119	-.057
			(0.257)	(0.17)
Income Ab. Av.			0.043	-.035
			(0.184)	(0.168)
Constant	0.466		0.344	0.34
	(0.219)**		(0.38)	(0.264)
N	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000

Table 10: Treatment Effects: Investigation Outcome, Heard of ICC Interactions, including DKRTA

	Logit	Region FE	w/ controls	Region FE w/ controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-.107	-.059	-.104	-.067
	(0.17)	(0.224)	(0.184)	(0.228)
Gov. Approval	0.167	0.149	0.216	0.179
	(0.156)	(0.201)	(0.149)	(0.203)
Tmt.∗Gov. App.	-.244	-.324	-.257	-.335
	(0.283)	(0.284)	(0.29)	(0.287)
Uzebk			-.480	-.633
			(0.235)**	(0.218)***
Under 50			0.152	0.124
			(0.166)	(0.148)
Male			0.036	0.066
			(0.209)	(0.148)
Post Sec. Educ.			0.316	0.362
			(0.179)*	(0.158)**
Employed			-.027	0.052
			(0.248)	(0.171)
Income Ab. Av.			0.072	-.003
			(0.169)	(0.171)
Constant	0.562		0.318	
	(0.174)***		(0.335)	
N	960	960	960	960

Table 11: Treatment Effects: Investigation Outcome, Gov. Approval Interactions, including DKRTA

1.6 Effect of Treatment on DKRTA

Perhaps most importantly, we also assess whether treatment assignment affected the probability that a respondent chose DKRTA. The main worry would be that treatment assignment caused certain respondents to be more likely to choose the DKRTA answer. Under the control condition, there should be less worry about misrepresentation among respondents. There isn't much to fear from indicating approval or disapproval of an abstract, foreign investigation.

Fortunately, this does not appear to be the case. Table 12 shows the effect of treatment assignment on a binary indicator variable for whether the respondent chose DKRTA, from a logit regression. The columns indicate different subsamples: full sample, Osh/Osh Oblast/Jalal Abad only, non Osh/Osh Oblast/Jalal Abad regions, Uzbeks in all regions, non Uzbeks in all regions, and finally Uzbeks in Osh/Osh Oblast/Jalal Abad.

The estimated effects are all negative and insignificant in all but one specification. This indicates that treatment did not make respondents more likely to choose DKRTA. If anything, this indicates that treatment made them more willing to express a particular opinion. We were particularly interested in these relationships in the Osh regions and for Uzbeks in those regions. There

is not evidence that assignment to treatment increased the likelihood of a respondent choosing DKRTA for any of those more vulnerable - and therefore potentially more likely to choose DKRTA - populations.

	All	OOJ	Non-OOJ	Uzbek, All Reg.	non-Uz., All Reg.	Uz., OOJ
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	-.179	-.098	-.229	-.747	-.090	-.578
	(0.16)	(0.264)	(0.203)	(0.42)*	(0.174)	(0.475)
e(N)	1,000	421	579	116	884	86

Table 12: Treatment Effect on DKRTA, Investigation Outcome

1.7 Balance Checks, Kyrgyz Survey

In the main manuscript, we briefly described balance across control and treatment conditions. The full results and comparisons for the Kyrgyz survey are below. The first table describes balance in treatment across regions. The second table describes treatment versus control for the respondent-level characteristics we used in the main analyses. We also included the Uzbek indicator variable here, since ethnicity was a focus of the analysis.

As mentioned in the manuscript, the balance is generally good, with the exception of males being more likely to receive the treatment. If we limit the balance analysis to the control variables, excluding the male variable, the overall χ^2 statistic is insignificant, indicating a failure to reject the null of balance.

	Control	Treatment	Adj. Difference	Adj. Diff. Null SD	SD	z
Bishkek	0.17800	0.17600	-0.00200	0.02415	-0.00523	-0.08281
Chui	0.16000	0.16000	0.00000	0.02320	0.00000	0.00000
Issyk-Kul	0.08000	0.08200	0.00200	0.01726	0.00732	0.11585
Naryn	0.04600	0.04400	-0.00200	0.01312	-0.00964	-0.15247
Talas	0.03800	0.04000	0.00200	0.01225	0.01032	0.16326
Osh Oblast	0.19200	0.19200	0.00000	0.02492	0.00000	0.00000
Jalal-Abad	0.18000	0.17800	-0.00200	0.02426	-0.00521	-0.08245
Batken	0.07600	0.07800	0.00200	0.01687	0.00749	0.11856
Osh City	0.05000	0.05000	0.00000	0.01379	0.00000	0.00000

Table 13: Balance Assessment, Kyrgyz Survey, Region Indicators

	Control	Treatment	Adj. Difference	Adj. Diff. Null SD	SD	z
Uzbek	1.10e-01	1.22e-01	1.20e-02	2.03e-02	3.74e-02	5.92e-01
Age Under 50	6.74e-01	6.38e-01	-3.60e-02	3.01e-02	-7.58e-02	-1.20e+00
Male	3.18e-01	4.82e-01	1.64e-01	3.10e-02	3.39e-01	5.29e+00***
Any PS Educ.	3.58e-01	3.84e-01	2.60e-02	3.06e-02	5.38e-02	8.51e-01
Employed	2.44e-01	2.84e-01	4.00e-02	2.79e-02	9.07e-02	1.43e+00
Income Ab. Av.	7.88e-01	7.66e-01	-2.20e-02	2.63e-02	-5.28e-02	-8.35e-01

Table 14: Balance Assessment, Kyrgyz Survey, Controls

2 United States Survey: Main Analysis

Our use of the Kyrgyz setting raises two threats to external validity. First, our finding that citizens reacted negatively to an investigation into Osh could be influenced by some features of those events, such that an investigation would simply be viewed as a bad idea. In other words, there could be some unobservable factor, that Kyrgyz citizens understand, but not us as analysts, that generates a negative reaction to a hypothetical investigation. Citizens may not have a negative reaction to all investigations, only those that are unproductive or unnecessary. Although unlikely based on contextual knowledge, open-ended survey responses, and information from the survey enumerators, it is possible.

Second, respondents' negative reaction to local investigations, compared to foreign investigations, may be more pronounced in some types of countries. For example, we might find negative reactions in lesser-developed, lower rule of law countries like Kyrgyzstan, as opposed to countries with deeper traditions of rule of law. Perhaps in a country with a more developed judiciary, lower levels of corruption, or a greater experience with and perceived legitimacy of legal institutions, respondents would be more open to ICC scrutiny.

To assess whether our findings are artifacts of either feature of Kyrgyzstan, we replicated our study in the United States. While the U.S. undoubtedly occupies a unique role in world affairs, it shares some contextual similarities with Kyrgyzstan. Like Kyrgyzstan, the U.S. has signed but not ratified the Rome Statute. The two countries' legal status vis-a-vis the ICC are thus similar. The U.S. has also been considered a possible target for ICC investigations due to military actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Like the Kyrgyz setting, there has not been any investigation into violence in Afghanistan, allowing us to construct a plausible hypothetical condition. On the other hand, the U.S. is a more developed country, generally thought to have a strong tradition of rule of law. If we find that U.S. citizens react negatively to ICC investigations, it provides some support that our findings are generalizable.

As with the Kyrgyz study, we preregistered with EGAP (Protocol no. [anonymous]). Overall, analysis of our U.S. survey suggests that the identified treatment effect is not idiosyncratic to Kyrgyzstan. The significant negative treatment effect for investigation and ICC approval suggests that a lack of respect for the rule of law does not explain our Krygyz findings. In a country where the citizens ostensibly respect the rule of law, the United States, respondents were just as, if not more, prone to react negatively to a local investigation and to further reduce approval for the institution itself.

The U.S. results are also telling since they are unlikely to be explained uncertainty about disrupting the domestic status quo. Even if the ICC investigated allegations of US crimes in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that US citizens would experience violence or domestic conflict. The US results are more likely explained by the psychological explanations in the theoretical section, such as biases that affect one?s evaluation of personal, as opposed to abstract, events. This may be one source of the exceptionalism often associated with U.S. citizens' foreign policy views (**?**).

2.1 U.S. Survey Recruitment

We fielded our survey using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (mTurk) platform in April of 2016, recruiting 1,503 respondents. Respondents accepted a task that entailed taking the survey after being directed to an the survey website Qualtrics. Respondents received compensation of $1.10, with an additional $0.05 bonus. The bonus was mentioned as a way to incentivize respondents to pay closer attention to the survey.

2.2 U.S. Survey Instrument

For the U.S. survey, we made three changes. First, we kept the control prompt the same ("Some people have suggested that the International Criminal Court should investigate the violence that occurred in other countries."), but changed the treatment prompt to be specific to an investigation that might involve U.S. actions in Afghanistan. The treatment read "Some people have suggested that the International Criminal Court should investigate the violence that occurred during the United States' war in Afghanistan from 2001-2014." This wording closely matches the Kyrgyz wording. It has a nearly identical word count, word tone, and time-frame as the Kyrgyz treatment.[3]

The second change concerns our measure of proximity. Geographical proximity does not make sense for U.S. respondents concerning war in Afghanistan. While there is variation in geographical proximity (California is closer to Afghanistan than Iowa), the variation doesn't have meaningful implications. However, U.S. respondents vary in their social proximity to the war in Afghanistan. Many U.S. citizens have close friends or family who serve in the military, which may heighten their sensitivity to an ICC investigation of the military. To measure this proximity, we included two pre-treatment items that ask "Have [you]/[your close friends or family] ever served in the United States Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard) or the National Guard?" We expect that the treatment effect to be stronger for individuals who respond to either of these questions in the affirmative.

Third, we included a longer battery of post-treatment questions. Since our U.S. recruitment platform was much less costly than the face-to-face Kyrgyz surveys, we included some open-ended items asking respondents to provide a brief explanation for their answers. We also included items that measured the degree to which respondents espoused Realist beliefs about international relations, their overall trust in institutions, and their political knowledge. These inclusions allow us to explore a few alternative ideas about attitudes toward the ICC. We collected the usual demographic information as well, such as party idea and the respondent's ideology.

[3] We also made a slight change to the introductory prompt. The U.S. survey does not say that the U.S. "has taken steps to join the ICC," because the veracity of that claim is ambiguous. The U.S. has signed the Rome Statue, but moved to abrogate its signature.



Figure 12: Treatment Effects: Investigation Outcome (US Data)

2.3 U.S. Investigation Approval

We first analyzed whether U.S. respondents would approve less of U.S. investigations compared to foreign ones. Table 15 replicates the analysis conducted in the Kyrgyz sample as closely as possible. The table shows coefficients from a logit model regressing the binary measure of approval for investigations on a treatment indicator and a set of respondent characteristics. In both specifications, approval for investigations was significantly lower for respondents assigned to the treatment compared to the control group. The magnitude of the treatment effect was slightly larger for the U.S. sample, compared to the Kyrgyz sample. In the control group, approximately 71% of respondents approved of investigations, compared to only roughly 60% in the treatment group. Figure 12 shows these same results using the Bayesian estimation approach.

We also included indicator variables for whether the respondent was male, under 50 years old, had any post-secondary education, was employed, white, and had an income that was above the sample average. We did this to match the set of control variables used in the main, Kyrgyz analysis. We further included standard party identification and ideology measures, as well as measures of how the respondent scored on a 5 item international relations-specific political knowledge battery and a battery assessing the respondent's general confidence in institutions.

Drawing on research from **?**, we included a set of questions designed to measure the degree to which the respondent held "folk realist" views about international relations. The results regarding standard respondent characteristics are as one might expect. More liberal respondents and those who identify with the Democratic party are more likely to approve of investigations under both treatment and control conditions. Consistent with **?**, respondents who hold more realist views are less supportive of investigations. None of the other variables are statistically significant predictors on investigation approval.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-.515	-.465	-.448	-.457	-.498
	(0.11)***	(0.128)***	(0.132)***	(0.132)***	(0.14)***
Male		-.153	-.048	-.032	-.097
		(0.129)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.143)
Age Under 50		0.726	0.707	0.622	0.538
		(0.174)***	(0.183)***	(0.183)***	(0.195)***
Any PS Educ.		0.183	0.102	0.037	0.075
		(0.181)	(0.186)	(0.188)	(0.2)
Employed		0.128	0.144	0.15	0.237
		(0.172)	(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.187)
Income Ab. Av.		-.102	0.002	0.014	-.078
		(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Democrat			0.766		0.586
			(0.15)***		(0.163)***
Republican			-.424		-.043
			(0.18)**		(0.204)
Liberal				0.948	
				(0.175)***	
Conservative				-.177	
				(0.192)	
White			0.037	-.016	-.009
			(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.174)
Polit. Know.					0.06
					(0.072)
Folk Realism Sum					-.216
					(0.033)***
Conf. Inst. Sum					-.014
					(0.03)
Constant	0.913	0.105	-.246	-.295	0.714
	(0.081)***	(0.241)	(0.314)	(0.324)	(0.469)
N	1,494	1,111	1,109	1,109	1,036

Estimates from logit regressions of investigation dependent variable on treatment and various covariates.

Table 15: Effect of Treatment on Investigation DV, U.S. Survey

2.4 US Results: Proximity Moderation

We then analyzed whether treatment effects were moderated by proximity. To measure the respondent's connection with the military, we coded a binary variable equal to one for respondents who either had served in the military themselves or indicated they had close friends or family in the military. Interestingly, and contrary to our expectations, this variable did not substantially moderate the treatment effect. Among respondents without contact with the military, approval for investiga-

tions was approximately 74% in the control group, compared to 62% in the treatment group, for a difference of approximately -12%. Among respondents with contact with the military, approval for investigations was approximately 69% in the control group, compared to 57% in the treatment group, for a difference of -12%. Table 16 shows these same results statistically, with logit regressions analogous to those in the Kyrgyz analysis. In general, the treatment effects are smaller for those with family or friends in the military.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-.561	-.523	-.504	-.482	-.427
	(0.157)***	(0.181)***	(0.185)***	(0.186)***	(0.195)**
Mliitary	-.280	-.282	-.224	-.119	-.007
	(0.164)*	(0.19)	(0.194)	(0.196)	(0.209)
Tmt.∗Mil.	0.081	0.109	0.108	0.046	-.150
	(0.221)	(0.256)	(0.263)	(0.264)	(0.281)
Male		-.151	-.047	-.033	-.099
		(0.13)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.143)
Under 50		0.702	0.691	0.614	0.536
		(0.175)***	(0.183)***	(0.184)***	(0.196)***
Post Sec. Educ.		0.188	0.108	0.041	0.079
		(0.181)	(0.186)	(0.189)	(0.2)
Employed		0.143	0.156	0.157	0.243
		(0.173)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.187)
Income Ab. Av.		-.104	0.0002	0.013	-.081
		(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Democrat			0.762		0.581
			(0.151)***		(0.163)***
Republican			-.416		-.046
			(0.18)**		(0.204)
Liberal				0.937	
				(0.175)***	
Conservative				-.176	
				(0.192)	
White			0.046	-.010	0.0008
			(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.175)
Pol. Know.					0.06
					(0.072)
Folk Realism					-.216
					(0.033)***
Conf. in Inst.					-.014
					(0.03)
Constant	1.056	0.248	-.142	-.235	0.701
	(0.118)***	(0.262)	(0.33)	(0.341)	(0.477)
N	1,494	1,111	1,109	1,109	1,036

Estimates from logit regressions of investigation dependent variable on treatment and various covariates.

Table 16: Effect of Treatment on Investigation DV by Military and Non-Military, U.S. Survey

2.5 US Results: Heard of ICC, Democrat Moderation

Respondents who had heard of the ICC did have weaker treatment effects in the US survey, as in Table 17. This is different from the Kyrgyz results and consistent with the predictions of existing work. For government approval, we used an indicator variable for whether the respondent was a Democrat. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, the government generally associated with abuses that the ICC might investigate (that of George W. Bush) was not in power at the time of our survey. This implies a smaller treatment effects for Democrats as a result. This would be consistent with the idea that Democrats support an investigation of the previous administration. The results are consistent with this expectation as in Table 18.

	1	2	3	4	5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-.733	-.763	-.770	-.886	-.561
	(0.354)**	(0.404)*	(0.415)*	(0.418)**	(0.442)
Heard of ICC	0.033	-.062	-.038	-.047	0.139
	(0.163)	(0.192)	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.214)
Tmt.∗Heard	0.144	0.198	0.215	0.285	0.044
	(0.221)	(0.256)	(0.263)	(0.265)	(0.281)
Male		-.147	-.037	-.016	-.078
		(0.131)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.145)
Under 50		0.71	0.685	0.59	0.506
		(0.176)***	(0.185)***	(0.186)***	(0.197)**
Post Sec. Educ.		0.182	0.108	0.043	0.092
		(0.183)	(0.188)	(0.191)	(0.201)
Employed		0.124	0.139	0.144	0.23
		(0.173)	(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.187)
Income Ab. Av.		-.095	0.012	0.029	-.064
		(0.135)	(0.14)	(0.141)	(0.15)
Democrat			0.766		0.587
			(0.151)***		(0.164)***
Republican			-.434		-.052
			(0.181)**		(0.205)
Liberal				0.963	
				(0.175)***	
Conservative				-.184	
				(0.193)	
White			0.037	-.016	-.007
			(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.175)
Pol. Know.					0.081
					(0.074)
Folk Realism					-.218
					(0.033)***
Conf. in Inst.					-.013
					(0.03)
Constant	0.863	0.207	-.180	-.221	0.419
	(0.264)***	(0.391)	(0.447)	(0.462)	(0.611)
N	1,493	1,110	1,108	1,108	1,035

Estimates from logit regressions of investigation dependent variable on treatment and various covariates.

Table 17: Effect of Treatment on Investigation DV, Heard of ICC Interaction Terms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-.429	-.821	-.818	-.539	-.731
	(0.145)***	(0.151)***	(0.151)***	(0.16)***	(0.164)***
Democrat	0.928				
	(0.17)***				
Tmt.∗Dem.	-.168	0.779	0.774	0.175	0.483
	(0.229)	(0.179)***	(0.18)***	(0.204)	(0.196)**
Male		-.089	-.089	-.015	-.109
		(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.137)	(0.144)
Under 50		0.686	0.672	0.598	0.482
		(0.178)***	(0.18)***	(0.185)***	(0.195)**
Post Sec. Educ.		0.132	0.126	0.042	0.102
		(0.185)	(0.186)	(0.191)	(0.201)
Employed		0.149	0.147	0.145	0.232
		(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.179)	(0.186)
Income Ab. Av.		-.054	-.053	0.037	-.093
		(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.141)	(0.149)
Liberal				0.905	
				(0.186)***	
Conservative				-.179	
				(0.193)	
White			-.075	-.009	-.064
			(0.16)	(0.164)	(0.172)
Pol. Know.					0.078
					(0.073)
Folk Realism					-.244
					(0.03)***
Conf. in Inst.					-.009
					(0.03)
Constant	0.496	0.031	0.109	-.435	0.858
	(0.107)***	(0.324)	(0.365)	(0.401)	(0.535)
N	1,492	1,108	1,108	1,106	1,035

Estimates from logit regressions of investigation dependent variable on treatment and various covariates.

Table 18: Effect of Treatment on Investigation DV, Democrat Interaction Terms

2.6 US Results: ICC Approval

We also analyzed the ICC institutional approval outcome. The effect of treatment on the respondents' approval of the ICC was negative and significant in the U.S. sample. Like the Kyrgyz respondents, U.S. respondents' approval of the institution itself decreased with treatment. The suggestion of an investigation into the U.S. depressed general support for the institution. Among respondents in the control group, approximately 72% felt favorably about the ICC, compared to

66% in the treatment group. This difference remains significant in regression analysis in the U.S. sample. Perhaps feelings of American exceptionalism account for the persistence of this effect. Regardless, it is noteworthy, and perhaps grounds for further research, that the mere suggestion of a specific, hypothetical investigation can generate a negative effect on an institution's general legitimacy.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatmentt	-.273	-.297	-.274	-.280	-.321
	(0.112)**	(0.13)**	(0.133)**	(0.133)**	(0.143)**
Male		-.110	-.023	0.003	-.031
		(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.146)
Age Under 50		0.109	0.074	-.008	-.001
		(0.182)	(0.188)	(0.19)	(0.205)
Any PS Educ.		0.336	0.272	0.245	0.219
		(0.181)*	(0.185)	(0.187)	(0.202)
Employed		0.014	0.023	0.041	0.013
		(0.177)	(0.181)	(0.182)	(0.194)
Income Ab. Av.		-.041	0.039	0.033	-.103
		(0.138)	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.154)
Democrat			0.652		0.368
			(0.152)***		(0.166)**
Republican			-.259		0.014
			(0.18)		(0.209)
Liberal				0.703	
				(0.177)***	
Conservative				-.260	
				(0.193)	
White			0.05	0.013	-.129
			(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.18)
Polit. Know.					-.022
					(0.074)
Folk Realism Sum					-.238
					(0.033)***
Conf. Inst. Sum					0.139
					(0.033)***
Constant	0.938	0.62	0.305	0.351	1.443
	(0.082)***	(0.248)**	(0.317)	(0.327)	(0.487)***
N	1,493	1,110	1,108	1,108	1,035

Estimates from logit regressions of investigation dependent variable on treatment and various covariates.

Table 19: Effect of Treatment on ICC DV, U.S. Survey

3 United States Survey: Supplementary Analysis

3.1 US Survey with Time Limit Restriction

The US survey was conducted online, which raises the possibility that respondents were distracted or answered questions too quickly. While we do not have any reason to expect this to bias treatment effects in any particular way, we also wanted to replicate the analyses using a "time limited sample" (TLS). The respondents took an average of approximately 10 minutes to complete our survey. For the TLS, we excluded respondents that took the survey in less than four minutes or who took over 20 minutes to complete the survey. This corresponds, roughly, to cutting the 5% of the sample who were fastest and slowest.

Table 20 and Table 21 replicate the main analyses for both the investigation and ICC outcome variables. The results are very similar. For both outcome variables, the treatment effects are negative and statistically significant in each specification.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-.533	-.490	-.479	-.502	-.550
	(0.118)***	(0.138)***	(0.142)***	(0.143)***	(0.152)***
Male		-.160	-.046	-.029	-.121
		(0.14)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.156)
Age Under 50		0.727	0.724	0.626	0.543
		(0.183)***	(0.193)***	(0.193)***	(0.205)***
Any PS Educ.		0.112	0.016	-.075	-.027
		(0.196)	(0.202)	(0.205)	(0.218)
Employed		0.233	0.227	0.258	0.341
		(0.184)	(0.19)	(0.192)	(0.201)*
Income Ab. Av.		-.046	0.095	0.086	0.025
		(0.145)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.163)
Democrat			0.837		0.718
			(0.163)***		(0.179)***
Republican			-.402		0.022
			(0.192)**		(0.218)
Liberal				1.027	
				(0.192)***	
Conservative				-.146	
				(0.208)	
White			-.072	-.119	-.095
			(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.194)
Pol. Know. Sum					0.123
					(0.08)
Folk Real. Sum					-.210
					(0.035)***
Conf. in Inst. Sum					-.034
					(0.033)
Constant	0.946	0.084	-.211	-.253	0.5
	(0.087)***	(0.255)	(0.343)	(0.352)	(0.51)
N	1306	965	963	964	901

Table 20: US Survey Investigation Outcome, with TLS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-.287	-.322	-.300	-.329	-.366
	(0.12)**	(0.141)**	(0.143)**	(0.144)**	(0.154)**
Male		-.122	-.022	-.0003	-.052
		(0.143)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.158)
Age Under 50		0.13	0.124	0.023	0.035
		(0.191)	(0.199)	(0.2)	(0.215)
Any PS Educ.		0.3	0.228	0.168	0.153
		(0.196)	(0.201)	(0.204)	(0.22)
Employed		0.029	0.023	0.05	0.004
		(0.191)	(0.195)	(0.197)	(0.21)
Income Ab. Av.		-.055	0.055	0.043	-.067
		(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.154)	(0.166)
Democrat			0.795		0.553
			(0.165)***		(0.18)***
Republican			-.190		0.116
			(0.191)		(0.222)
Liberal				0.828	
				(0.194)***	
Conservative				-.203	
				(0.208)	
White			0.046	-.0009	-.153
			(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.197)
Pol. Know Sum.					0.018
					(0.082)
Folk Real. Sum					-.228
					(0.035)***
Conf. in Inst. Sum					0.11
					(0.035)***
Constant	0.959	0.668	0.261	0.356	1.317
	(0.087)***	(0.262)**	(0.344)	(0.354)	(0.526)**
N	1305	964	962	963	900

Table 21: US Survey ICC Outcome, with TLS

3.2 US Survey Manipulation Checks

The US survey instrument included manipulation checks. We asked one question asking where the ICC was located (since this was included in the introductory text before treatment/control assignment) and another question that asked them to recall, essentially, whether they had been assigned to treatment or control. The respondents did very well on these checks. For the two questions, over 95% of respondents got each question correct.

Table 22 also shows that treatment assignment did not have a large effect on whether respondents answered the manipulation checks correctly. Both respondents in the treatment and control conditions seem to have paid attention well. For these two regressions, the dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent answered the question correctly.

	Manip 1	Manip 2
	(1)	(2)
Treatment	0.064	0.185
	(0.27)	(0.251)
Constant	3.195	2.969
	(0.189)***	(0.171)***
N	1494	1494

Table 22: (Non)Effect of Treatment on Manipulation Checks

3.3 Balance Checks and ANES Comparison, US Survey

Table 23 does the same balance checks for the US survey, using each of the respondent-level characteristics that we included in the regressions. There were not any significant differences in these characteristics across treatment and control conditions.

Table 24 compares our mTurk sample to the 2012 United States ANES face-to-face survey. As is common with mTurk and other online samples, ours tends to be younger, more liberal, and better educated than the respondents in the ANES. If anything, we might have expected those characteristics to be associated with *weaker* treatment effects, though we cannot say anything about population treatment effects with our online sample.

	Control	Treatment	Adj. Difference	Adj. Diff. Null SD	SD	z
Age Under 50	0.83718	0.84941	0.01223	0.01881	0.03363	0.64993
Male	0.50611	0.55218	0.04607	0.02584	0.09234	1.78320
Any PS Educ.	0.89145	0.88243	-0.00902	0.01640	-0.02847	-0.55020
Employed	0.80054	0.81506	0.01452	0.02039	0.03683	0.71184
Income Ab. Av.	0.55224	0.54557	-0.00666	0.02576	-0.01338	-0.25871

Table 23: Balance Assessment, US Survey, Controls

Variable	**MTurk Sample**		**2012 ANES**	
Gender	Male	Female	Male	Female
	731 (52.5%)	661 (47.5%)	2,845 (48%)	3,069 (52%)
Under 50	YES	NO	YES	NO
	1,172 (84%)	221 (16%)	2,805 (47%)	3,109 (53%)
Post-Secondary Education	YES	NO	YES	NO
	877 (85%)	159 (15%)	3,842 (65%)	2,072 (35%)
Employed	YES	NO	YES	NO
	1,121 (80.5%)	272 (19.5%)	3,095 (52%)	2,819 (48%)
Income above avg.	YES	NO	YES	NO
	763 (55%)	630 (45%)	3,095 (52%)	2,819 (48%)
White	YES	NO	YES	NO
	1,092 (78%)	301 (22%)	4,339 (73%)	1,575 (27%)
Democrat	YES	NO	YES	NO
	666 (48%)	727 (52%)	2,361 (40%)	3,553 (60%)
Republican	YES	NO	YES	NO
	266 (19%)	1,127 (21%)	1,389 (23.5%)	4,525 (76.5%)
Liberal	YES	NO	YES	NO
	799 (57.5%)	591 (42.52%)	1,474 (25%)	4,440 (75%)
Conservative	YES	NO	YES	NO
	341 (24.5%)	1,049 (75.5%)	3,916 (66%)	1,998 (34%)

Table 24: US Survey, Comparison to ANES